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Global Aging:  
Emerging Challenges
Alexandra Crampton
Abstract
Aging policy frameworks were devised during a demographic and economic 
context in which population aging seemed confined to wealthy nations. These 
countries could afford retirement policies that supported older workers, decreased 
unemployment among younger workers, and decreased family pressure to provide 
old age care. This calculation was based in part on failure to anticipate three 
demographic trends: continual decline in fertility below replacement rate, con-
tinual gains in longevity, and the rise of population aging in poor and “under-
developed” countries. These three trends now fuel a sense of crisis. In the global 
North, there is fear that increasing numbers of older adults will deplete state 
pension and health care systems. In the global South, the fear is that population 
aging coupled with family “breakdown” requires such state intervention. Natu-
ral disaster metaphors, such as “agequake” and “age-tsunami,” illustrate fears 
of a “graying globe” in which population aging implies population decay and 
economic destruction. Yet, global aging trends develop over decades and are not 
easily reversed. Longer-range trends can be addressed through revising policy 
frameworks to incorporate how growing old is moving from global exception to 
expectation.
The author would like to thank the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of  the Longer-
Range Future for support for writing this paper. The author is also grateful to Marah Curtis, 
Kate Cooney, and participants of  the Social Welfare Colloquium for thoughtful comments 
and incisive questions, and to Ruth Dunkle, Scott Geron, and Robert Hudson for their 
constructive reviews. 
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I. INTRoDucTIoN
For most of human history, reaching old age was an exception. Scholars 
estimate that global life expectancy up until the mid-18th century was only 25 
years (Vallin 2002). Reaching old age was cause for celebration. For example, 
the British crown began a practice in the early 20th century of sending special 
birthday congratulations to subjects on their 100th birthday. In 1917, seven 
men and 17 women received this greeting. Over the next few generations, the 
Queen became quite busy as old age in Western Europe moved from excep-
tion to expectation. By 1952, the average number of birthday telegrams was 
200. In 2007, the number was 8,439 (The Royal Household 2008/9).
Today, demographers note that population aging is a trend spreading across 
the world. Global life expectancy reached about 47 years by 1950, has reached 
age 67 today, and is projected to rise to 75 by 2050 (AARP 2007; United 
Nations 2009).1 Due to declining fertility, the proportion of older adults 
in the global population is also increasing. The global population of people 
60-plus is expected to rise from 10.8 percent in 2009 to almost 22 percent 
by 2050 (United Nations 2009). Women are making even greater gains than 
men. For example, female life expectancy continues to surpass that of men by 
a range of three to seven additional years worldwide (United Nations 2009).2 
In 2005, older women (60-plus) outnumbered older men by 67 million 
(United Nations 2005). Policy makers describe these trends as a “graying 
globe;” a more accurate image may be “the grannying of the globe.” 
Analysts describe this trend as part of a “longevity revolution” in which more 
people are reaching “old-old” age of 80-plus.3 This age group is the fastest grow-
ing segment of older adults worldwide (United Nations 2005). Those nations 
offering special birthday greetings will become busier by 2050, when a projected 
2.3 million people will become centenarians (Kalache et al. 2002). 
1. Long-range demographic statistics often include a lower, medium, and higher range of projected 
change. The statistics used to describe population aging trends and to create population pyramids use a 
medium-range projection.
2. Gender differences are more pronounced in later ages.  
3. As described by Kinsella and Phillips, “Almost one-half of people born today can expect to reach age 
80” (Kinsella and Phillips 2005).
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In the past, population aging was thought to be the result of successful develop-
ment. Aging policy, then, was confined to countries defined as either developed 
or well on their way. Some argued that there was “no aging” in poorer nations 
of the global South where older adults were protected by cultural norms and the 
state could rely on family to care for relatively few aging relatives (Cohen 1998).4 
Today, older adults may seem to have a greater presence in wealthy nations of 
the global North because the proportions of people 60 and 80-plus are higher 
(Tirrito 2003).5 However, most people aged 60-plus and about half of those 
aged 80-plus live in the global South. By 2050, 69 percent of the oldest old 
will be living in that region (United Nations, 2009). This is in part due to the 
greater overall population numbers 
in the global South, and also due 
to faster rates of increase among 
older populations in these regions 
(United Nations 2009; Demeny 
and McNicoll 2006). While the 
population of people 60-plus will 
increase from 231 million to 395 
million between 2000 and 2050 
in the global North, for example, 
the older population in the global South will increase from 374 million to 1.6 
billion during the same period (United Nations 2002). 
Population Aging: Development Success Story or Modern Policy crisis?
Demographers describe population aging as a modernization success story. 
This is because the key drivers of population aging are decreasing mortal-
ity and fertility, which have been important goals in development policy 
and planning for the past two generations. Yet, the discussion of old age in 
policy discourse has been much more pessimistic. A negative relationship is 
4. In this paper, the terms “global North and South” refer to regions considered modern and developed 
(the North) in contrast to those still developing (the South). Despite the problems with this approach, 
these terms are used given the tendency in aging policy to bifurcate concern between a global North of 
wealthier, aging populations and a global South of relatively poor and youthful populations.  
5. For example, the proportion of older adults in developed regions is projected to increase from one-
fifth to one-third of the regional population between 2005 and 2050. During the same period, the 
proportion of older adults in the global South is projected to increase from 8 percent to one-fifth of the 
regional population (United Nations 2005).
posited between aging and development, in which the role and social status 
of older adults declines as countries modernize and develop. State interven-
tion becomes necessary to provide jobs for younger workers and to support 
retirees. Old age then emerges in policy as a life stage characterized as 
unproductive and dependent. Aging policy focuses on the problems of pen-
sions and elder care. The chief measure for policy planning is dependency 
ratios, which calculate the boundary between productive citizens relative to 
the dependent. This boundary is set by the chronological age designated as 
old. Demographically younger nations tend to choose age 50 as the bound-
ary while aging nations use 60 or 65. Aging policy thus uses birthdays to 
divide populations between those who give and those who take from the 
formal economy and social welfare system. 
Given the characterization of aging as loss, policy analysts understandably 
view global aging trends with alarm. At an extreme, metaphors of natural 
disaster are used to warn of an impending “gray dawn” that threatens to 
“bankrupt” state welfare systems (Peterson 1999). Meanwhile, elder advo-
cates sound a different alarm in developing countries. They argue that coun-
tries are becoming “old before they are rich.” The informal policy of relying 
upon families for elder care is therefore unsustainable. Rather than a burden 
to the state, older adults are at risk of burdening families. 
Steps toward Long-Range Aging Policy
In taking a longer-range view, it is important to remember a previous popu-
lation crisis. Fear of “population explosion” began in the 1950s (Demeny 
and McNicoll 2006). The concern was that gains in mortality made possible 
through successful public health and medical interventions would result 
in exponential population growth unless checked by fertility decline. Policy 
interventions focused on decreasing birth rates through population and fam-
ily planning. What was unknown in 1969, when the UN Population Fund 
(UNFPA) was created, was that global birth rates were peaking between 
1965–1970 (Sadik 2002). Concerted policy efforts were therefore imple-
mented just as trends began to change. Successful intervention through 
policy then helped accelerate fertility decline (Caldwell 2002). Today, some 
countries are facing a new fear of birth dearth as fertility rates fall past the 
desired rates. For example, fear of population implosion helps drive pro-
While the population of people 60-
plus will increase from 231 million to 
395 million between 2000 and 2050 
in the global North, for example, the 
older population in the global South 
will increase from 374 million to 1.6 
 billion during the same period.  
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natalist policies in Western Europe and parts of Asia (Martin 1991; Robert-
son 2007). 
This past crisis was met with a reaction narrowly focused on one policy 
solution (family planning programs) to reduce birth rates. The current crisis 
now centers on those who reach an age of dependency at the other end of 
the lifespan. Given the global economic crisis, it is not surprising that such a 
population would be examined with alarm. At the same time, demographers 
project that population aging is 
beginning to slow. The global 
growth in older adults is cur-
rently peaking, and is projected 
to stabilize by 2025 (AARP 
2007). In addition, the rate of 
population aging is beginning to 
slow in the “oldest” country pop-
ulations even as that rate is beginning to take off in those countries in which 
youth currently occupy policy makers’ attention.6 A significant proportion 
of older adults in the future will come from these youthful populations. 
The enduring challenge is not how to simply reduce either the number or 
dependency of older adults. Nor can countries wait until they are wealthy 
enough to support national pension and health care programs. The long-
range policy challenge is how economic and human development policy and 
planning should include aging and the expectation of reaching old age. 
This paper addresses this challenge through examination of demographic 
trends, policy discourse, and ethnographic data. The historical experience 
in Western Europe has provided a classic model for explaining how aging 
becomes an important demographic and policy issue. In this model, popula-
tion aging trends emerge slowly through modernization and development.  
This is accompanied by erosion of elder status. By the time aging becomes a 
social problem demanding policy attention, the state is prepared to support 
older adults through pensions and health care. Individual countries can 
be analyzed as pre-transition, in transition, or post-transition. In looking 
6. For example, while the average age of the U.S. population is projected to increase by about three years 
over the next 20 years, the average age in Mexico is projected to increase by 20 years (Hewitt 2004). 
toward the longer-range future, however, a singular model becomes increas-
ingly insufficient. Demographic trends are outgrowing the classic model, 
and new policy challenges have emerged. These challenges are exacerbated 
by policy in which old age is narrowly defined by chronological age and 
as dependency and loss. Ethnographic study of older adults provides data 
for expanding policy frameworks. The data in this paper demonstrate how 
people become old (unrelated to birthdays) and how they rely on family 
and informal networks for care. Old age care is thus not only a problem for 
the state but part of a social contract between the state and the family in 
providing care and workforce productivity. Given demographic trends, this 
paper concludes with recommendations for re-conceptualizing aging and 
the problems of old age in policy and planning.
II. PoPuLATIoN AgINg by NuMbeRS: DeMogRAPhIc TReNDS
How do populations age? Demographers use several measures to define pop-
ulation aging, including absolute numbers, rates of increase, and proportion 
in relation to younger cohorts. The most common measures are average life 
expectancy at birth, and the proportion and rate of increase in older popula-
tions relative to younger cohorts (for example, see United Nations 2009). 
Young populations are those in which more than 30 percent of the popula-
tion is under 15 and less than 6 percent of the population is old (defined 
as 60- or 65-plus). Old populations are the reverse, and are particularly 
noted when the rate of increase is greatest among older cohorts (Cowgill 
1974). Another measure is the median age of a population. This is the age 
dividing the population in half. For example, the median age in China is 
projected to increase from 41 to 55 by 2050 (United Nations 2009). This 
means that half of the population will be over 55 and half will be under 55. 
By contrast, the median age for Niger as the world’s youngest population 
is 15 today and projected to be age 20 by the year 2050 (United Nations 
2009). Demographic trends are measured and projected through historical 
and current averages in fertility, mortality, and morbidity rates. (Morbidity 
refers to cause of death.) Current global aging trends are primarily driven 
by fertility decline, followed by mortality decline. National aging trends are 
also affected to varying extents by migration. 
The long-range policy challenge is how 
economic and human development 
policy and planning should include 
aging and the expectation of reaching 
old age.
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When demographers write of population aging as an indication of devel-
opment success, they are referring to fertility, mortality, and morbidity 
trends. These are captured through a tale of transitions in which developed 
countries have successfully reduced fertility and mortality rates. Morbidity 
trends show improved survival rates from acute infection and many illnesses 
 (Demeny and McNicoll 2006; Omran 1971; Sadik 2002). Development 
drives the demographic and epidemiologic change from “traditional societ-
ies” of no aging to “modern societies” with population aging. Policy analysts 
then examine how far individual countries have moved from traditional 
to modern development contexts. While this process unfolded slowly in 
Europe over centuries, demographic changes associated with development are 
now happening within decades. In fact, current and longer-range demo-
graphic patterns suggest that these models are increasingly outdated both 
in Europe (which is now in “post-transition”) and many other parts of the 
world. In particular, development has proven to be a highly variable and com-
plex process of social and economic change. Variables linking development 
and demographics ought to be disentangled from the historical European 
example used to create the classic models. Nevertheless, this section begins 
with the dominant theoretical tools currently used by policy makers within 
this linear, progressive model, and then discusses trends that fall outside this 
model using country-specific examples. 
Demographic Transition Theory
The demographic transition consists of four stages. The first stage is marked 
by high fertility and mortality.7 In the second stage, infant and child mortal-
ity decrease, and fertility rates then slowly decrease to replacement level. 
Replacement level is the number of births per woman that would keep 
population levels stable, and is estimated as 2.1 children per woman. In the 
third stage, infant and child mortality rates stabilize at a very low number. 
This causes population growth. As fertility rates fall, and as adult mortality 
rates also begin to fall, populations begin to “age.” In this fourth stage, when 
fertility and mortality rates are low, the demographic transition is complete. 
Population equilibrium theory suggests that population growth declines and 
that populations eventually stabilize (Vallin 2002).8 
7. For a review of the history and debate around demographic transition theory, see Kirk 1996.
8. Scholars debate whether and when populations stabilize. Long-range projections of world population 
Analyzing the how and why of population transition ties aging to develop-
ment. The main drivers are theorized not to be the arrival of industrializa-
tion as much as accompanying socioeconomic changes. The main factors 
are public health and education (Cowgill 1974). Again, the key transitions 
are changing fertility and mortality rates. In the first phase of transition, 
decreasing infant and child mortality rates lead to decreasing numbers of 
births. Public health is a factor as improved sanitation and health interven-
tions improve not only infant and child health but also maternal health out-
comes. Assuming rational calculation based on an ideal family size, women 
choose to reduce the number of pregnancies (Jones et al. 1997). As coun-
tries develop, families also choose to have fewer children as the “cost” per 
child in education and other preparation for later economic roles increases. 
Examination of fertility transition also shows a correlation between declin-
ing fertility and the rise of women’s education, delayed marriage, and age 
of first birth. Changes in choices and behaviors are thought to happen as 
a consequence of policy. For example, aging policies are partly intended to 
reduce fertility and ideal family size because parents no longer need to have 
children as an informal social insurance policy. 
epidemiologic Transition Theory
Abdel R. Omran first posited epidemiologic theory as a way to explain the 
correlation between mortality patterns, morbidity patterns, and demo-
graphic transition (Omran 1971). This theory suggests that demographic 
transitions are accompanied by an epidemiologic transition in which trends 
in cause of death shift from acute and infectious diseases to chronic and 
degenerative conditions. These are divided into three stages: The Age of 
Pestilence and Famine, The Age of Receding Pandemics, and The Age of 
Degenerative and Manmade Diseases (Omran 1971). While the first is 
most often used to describe “premodern” times, the second and third are 
used to describe the more recent past and current trends. Development 
brings improved living conditions, public health measures, and basic medi-
cal interventions. These changes enable more infants and children to survive 
aging tend to use population stabilization theory, and to project that population growth will continue to 
decline and eventually stabilize at about 9 or 10 billion people. This stabilization will begin around 2050 
(Vallin 2002).
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into adulthood. Morbidity trends eventually reflect the health problems 
more typical of later life, such as diabetes, obesity, and heart disease. These 
diseases are the so-called “diseases of civilization” (Barrett et al. 1998). In 
Europe and North America, these trends are often analyzed as consequences 
of development more broadly—such as changes in sanitation and hygiene 
that happened over time. In developing countries, these trends are also 
attributed to concerted campaigns and interventions in the immediate 
post-World War II period, most of which have declined since 1960 (Sadik 
2002).9 As this general trend is noted in different world regions, the term 
“health transition” is used to write optimistically of generally improved 
health and longevity as a longer-range trend (Kinsella and Phillips 2005). 
Population Pyramids as Demographic Age gauge
Since the 1950s, when many current population planning and research 
programs first started, population demographics have been expressed in 
graphs called population pyramids. The left side of the graph depicted the 
numbers of males in each age cohort, from 0–5 at the bottom to 60-plus 
at the top. The right side of the graph depicted the numbers of females 
in each cohort. At that time, 
the typical graph and the one 
assumed to be the premodern or 
pre-industrial norm for popula-
tions created a pyramid shape. 
These “youthful” populations 
are characterized by high fertility 
and mortality rates. As a result, 
the base of the pyramid is always 
much wider than the top. These are populations in which reaching old age 
is exceptional and average life expectancy might range from 40 to 60. Over 
the past few generations, however, population pyramids for many coun-
tries have changed shape. These pyramid permutations can be categorized 
into younger and older populations as aging trends emerge. For example, 
9. If the decline is significant, then it may suggest that population aging trends seen today could be less 
impressive in the longer-range future. That is, the infants and children who benefited from interventions 
of the 1950s are the current cohort of older adults in the global South.
Pakistan has a youthful population. The population pyramid takes a classic 
shape in which high fertility rates mean that the largest cohorts also are the 
youngest. Moving up the pyramid, each cohort tapers to a smaller size. A 
steeper shape indicates high mortality rates as fewer people survive into the 
next age range. Italy, by contrast, has an aging population. Very low birth-
rates mean much smaller young cohorts. High life expectancy coupled with 
longevity trends keep each cohort from shrinking quickly as cohorts age up 
the pyramid. These shape differences can be compared in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Population Pyramids for Pakistan and Italy
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Database
In describing how populations age, demographers distinguish between aging 
“from below” and aging “from above” as seen in population pyramids. The 
main factor driving up life expectancy over the past two generations has 
been declining (and very low) infant and child mortality. This is in part 
because most people who survive into mature adulthood will survive into 
old age. Growing old thus depends very much on what happens as popu-
lation cohorts grow up. Demographers refer to population aging trends 
caused by decreasing fertility and infant mortality as “aging from below,” as 
larger young cohorts survive childhood and age up the population pyramid. 
Brazil provides an example of aging from below. As can be seen in com-
parisons of population pyramids from 2000 and 2050 in Figure 2, larger 
cohorts move from those at the lower (younger) tiers of the pyramid up into 
adulthood through middle to old age over time. 
Over the past few generations, how-
ever, population pyramids for many 
countries have changed shape. These 
pyramid permutations can be catego-
rized into younger and older popula-
tions as aging trends emerge.
12     The Pardee Papers | No. 6 | August 2009  Global Aging: Emerging Challenges    13
Figure 2: Population Pyramids for brazil, 2000 and 2050
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Database
In addition to aging from below, populations can also age “from above” 
through declining mortality rates and overall growth rates in adult cohorts. 
Italy is one example, as can be seen from the shape of its population pyra-
mid in Figure 1. Global variation in adult mortality is not as great as in 
adult life expectancy at birth. For example, life expectancy at birth ranges 
from 55 in the global South to 77 in the global North (United Nations 
2009). This reflects an overall range in life expectancy at birth from age 33 
in Swaziland to age 82 in Japan and Hong Kong (United Nations 2009). 
The gap in life expectancy for older adults, however, is much smaller. Added 
years once an individual reaches age 60 range from an additional 15 years 
for African men to an additional 25 years for North American women 
(Aboderin 2007). The phenomenon of aging from above helps explain 
population growth in countries with birth rates at or below replacement 
level. For example, the birth rate in China is below replacement level, and 
population growth has slowed but not yet stabilized (Jianmin 2007). Aging 
from above has also required demographers to add tiers to the tops of popu-
lation pyramids. 
Of course, the most immediate way in which population aging trends can 
change is through immigration. Although immigration does not typically 
affect demographic trends as much as fertility and mortality rates, this obvi-
ously depends upon immigration policy and migration flows. In particular, 
the United States is one of the younger populations in the global North 
largely due to immigration. The current global migration rate is about two 
million people each year (United Nations 2009). Over the next 50 years, the 
United States is projected to continue receiving about 1.1 million people 
each year (United Nations 2009). Although population aging pressures 
spark immigration debate in Europe and Japan, policies remain compara-
tively restrictive. 
Population pyramids from Germany and the U.S. can be used to compare 
the impact of population aging from above with the added influence in the 
U.S. of immigration (Figure 3). While longevity trends are reflected in the 
cohort size of older generations for both countries, U.S. immigration adds 
more people to younger cohorts. The U.S. also has a higher fertility rate, 
which is partly due to a relatively youthful immigrant population. The U.S. 
pyramid thus takes a more dome-like shape in contrast to the more inverted 
German pyramid. 
Figure 3: Population Pyramids for germany and the united States
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Database
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From Population Pyramids to Population Permutations:  
outgrowing Transition Theories 
Policy makers examine population pyramids to map each country onto the stage 
of demographic transition. Over time, the pyramid shape is expected to become 
more uniform. Analysts use the changing shapes of population pyramids 
to determine how far a country has progressed and what may be needed to 
complete transition. However, there are three major trends that suggest new (or 
at least more complex) models are needed. The first is rapid fertility decline that 
continues beyond replacement level rather than stabilizing at or near it. The 
second is a longevity trend in which life expectancy of adults continues to rise. 
This means that increasing numbers of adults will reach old and old-old ages. In 
some countries, this trend has also been coupled with “morbidity compression” 
in which more people live healthier adult years before they become very sick 
at the end of their lifespan (Fries 1989, Kalache et al. 2002). The third trend is 
how much more rapidly demographic transitions are happening in the global 
South in comparison with Western Europe’s slow trajectory. This means that 
countries are “getting old before rich” as population aging outpaces economic 
development. In addition, the classic model suggests progressive change from 
high fertility and mortality to low fertility and mortality. Yet, fertility and/or 
mortality trends have also reversed in some countries.
In addition to the elusiveness of a universal theoretical framework to explain 
demographic transition, morbidity trends in some countries challenge the util-
ity of epidemiologic transition theory. The health transition of epidemiologic 
theory was first devised in the 1970s, when there was high optimism that medi-
cal technology would eventually cure most health problems. (Barrett et al. 1998) 
Discoveries of antibiotics and vaccinations led to confidence that diseases could 
be eradicated. Since then, there have been many examples of how widespread 
use of these drugs leads to a more resistant and sometimes more virulent strain. 
One such example is the use of chloroquine, which has led to chloroquine-
resistant malaria (Barrett et al. 1998). In addition, diseases can seem to be on 
the wane only to return at a later time, such as tuberculosis. This disease is 
associated with poor living conditions. The persistence of poverty worldwide is 
therefore considered a major factor in disease resurgence (Barrett et al. 1998). In 
addition, new diseases can emerge through development beyond the “diseases of 
civilization.” For example, large commercial farms easily spread viruses, which 
are then transported through distribution of products and travel by consumers. 
Rather than a transition from acute and infectious to chronic and degenerative 
illness as the major cause of death, countries such as Mexico include both as 
leading causes of death (Barrett et al. 1998). Mortality and morbidity trends are 
thus proving more complex than was anticipated more than 30 years ago. 
One way to examine the complex interplay of variables shaping population 
aging trends is by comparing national populations. Variations in shape can 
be partially explained by post-demographic trends, speed of transition, the 
impact of policy, the reversal of trends, and the impact of pandemics. In the 
next section, Japan provides an example of a post-transition country, Mexico 
as a developing country in rapid transition, China as a country in which 
policy has dramatically impacted demography, Russia as a country with 
trend reversals, and South Africa as a country radically impacted by HIV/
AIDS. Each trend presents challenges in developing long-term aging policy. 
Post-Demographic Transition: Vertical Expansion and Shrinking Bases. In post-
transition countries, fertility and mortality rates continue to decline past 
previous model predictions. Populations may shrink as fertility rates plunge 
below replacement level, while mortality decline brings greater lifespan in 
each generation. Today, there is speculation about what the absolute ceiling 
on longevity might be. One provocative question is whether life expectancy 
could rise to the level of maximum life expectancy, which some estimate as 
120 years. Another important trend 
is in changing family composition 
(Bengtson 2001; Tirrito 2003). This 
has emerged as more women have 
fewer than two children and more 
people live into old-old age. Fam-
ily trees with many branches begin 
to resemble family “beanpoles” 
(Bengtson 2001). In beanpole fami-
lies, there are no (or few) siblings, 
cousins, aunts, and uncles. At the same time, each generation can live long 
enough to see the birth of great-grandchildren. The result can be four-
Today, there is speculation about 
what the absolute ceiling on longev-
ity might be. One provocative ques-
tion is whether life expectancy could 
rise to the level of maximum life 
expectancy, which some estimate as 
120 years. 
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generation households in which parents and grandchildren support great-
grandparents and a great-grandchild. 
Japan provides an example of a post-transition country of high life expec-
tancy, low fertility, and great longevity. In 1950, it was one of the “young-
est” countries in the world, with a median age of 22; now, the median age is 
41. By 2025, median age will approach 50 (Hewitt 2004). The birth rate is 
more than one-third below replacement level. Japan’s projected population 
pyramid dramatically reverses the pyramid shape (Figures 4 and 5). This 
means fewer children in young cohorts and a greater bulge as comparatively 
large cohorts age past adulthood into old (and old-old) age.  
Figure 4: Population Pyramid for Japan, 1950
Data Source: United Nations World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision
Figure 5: Population Pyramids for Japan, 2000 and 2050
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Database
Demographic Transition at High Speed: Getting Old before Getting Rich. As previ-
ously discussed, demographers have tracked the “fertility transition” in 
which birth rates fall to replacement level. In the classic demographic transi-
tion model based on European history, this process took many generations. 
Since the 1950s, however, fertility transition in some parts of the world has 
required decades rather than generations. For example, the fertility transi-
tion in France, in which birth rates fell from six children per woman to 2.1 
children, required 115 years (Kinsella and Phillips 2005). The same transi-
tion in Mexico, however, took 30 years (Pujol 1992). Meanwhile, mortal-
ity rates have also dropped more quickly in parts of the global South than 
projections based on European experience. For example, Mexico’s fertility 
transition was preceded (between 1950–1975) by a nearly 50 percent drop 
in death rate (Pujol 1992). In many countries, dramatic demographic trends 
are quickly outpacing economic 
growth. This challenges the classic 
model in which population growth 
and later stabilization seem to ac-
company higher standards of living 
and social welfare expansion. Instead, 
countries can “get old before they 
get rich.” This raises questions of 
who will care for those older adults 
as they become more frail and 
dependent in countries where relatively few are covered through private or 
state social welfare policies.  
Acceleration of Demographic Transition through Policy. China provides another 
example of a country in which population aging seems to outpace economic 
growth. China has a projected population pyramid of rapid population 
aging. This is caused in part by the family planning policy often known as 
the “one child policy.” This effort to lower fertility rates by restricting most 
couples to one child per family is estimated to have “averted over 300 mil-
lion births” (Greenhalgh 2003). The longer-range challenge is a “4-2-1” 
problem, in which one adult child will need to care for two aging parents 
and four aging grandparents. This problem is  exacerbated by the govern-
ment’s reduction of social welfare support dating back to the 1980s 
In many countries, dramatic demo-
graphic trends are quickly outpacing 
economic growth. This challenges 
the classic model in which population 
growth and later stabilization seem 
to accompany higher standards of 
living and social welfare expansion.
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(Jianmin 2007). Social security is not widely available, and currently sup-
ports only 26 percent of the older population (Jianmin 2007). To compare 
how much China has changed since the one child policy and how much 
more the population will change, see Figure 6.
Figure 6: Population Pyramids for china
Data Source: United Nations World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision
Transition Reversals and Deviations. While demographic transition has ac-
celerated in countries like China, this transition has reversed in many parts 
of Eastern Europe (for example, see Coleman 2006). Life expectancy has 
been decreasing in Eastern Europe since the 1980s (United Nations 2009). 
The Russian Federation has one of the lowest life expectancies in the global 
North (United Nations 2009). Since the 1990s, male mortality has in-
creased, particularly in cohorts who should be in their productive years. At 
the same time, female infertility rates have increased. Population projections 
for Russia are a longer-range trend of population decline (Coleman 2006). 
These shifts can be seen in comparing population pyramids from 2009 and 
2050 (Figure 7).  
Figure 7: Population Pyramids for Russia, 2009 and 2050
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Database
Pandemics. Scholars have argued that pandemics cannot be eradicated but 
are instead periodic and inevitable. The most dramatic example currently 
has been HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Southern Africa, the hard-
est hit region, population growth has slowed to 0.6 percent and continues 
to decline (United Nations 2009). Life expectancy has fallen to 52 from 
the average of 61 years just 10 to 15 years ago (United Nations 2009). 
Although average life expectancy at birth has fallen dramatically, the disease 
has primarily robbed populations of the middle generation, leaving older 
adults to care for their sick and dying children as well as their grandchil-
dren. There are currently 24.7 million adults and children who are HIV 
positive. As many as 12.2 million children have lost one or more parent 
to AIDS (Aboderin 2007). At the same time, there have been fewer adults 
having children who survive childhood, particularly when the child is also 
infected. This results in future trends of smaller cohorts at every age, even as 
the number of people 60 and over will continue to be significant. In South 
Africa, for example, overall the population growth rate is in decline (U.S. 
Census Bureau International Database 2009). However, the proportion of 
people 60-plus is expected to more than double from 7 to 14 percent of the 
population (United Nations 2009). The proportion of people 80-plus is 
expected to rise from 0.6 percent to more than 2 percent of the total popu-
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lation (United Nations 2009). Population pyramids from 2000, 2025, and 
2050 (Figure 8) help illustrate how population aging continues in the face 
of a pandemic as found in South Africa.10 
Figure 8: Population Pyramids for South Africa
Data Source: United Nations World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision
To summarize, both the demographic and epidemiologic theories under-
lie classic models by which demographic trends have been measured and 
monitored. The classic models have been useful for explaining population 
aging from the historical perspective of how these trends first emerged in 
Europe. They also help explain how population aging trends are leading to 
global trends in which old age should be an expectation. However, develop-
ment is not a uniform process that changes populations from a pyramid to 
a more uniform shape. While variables associated with development—such 
10. Long-range population projections are typically based on current assumptions that the impact of 
HIV/AIDS is declining, and that the long-term impact will attenuate by 2050. 
as formal education, delay of marriage, and reduced family size—remain 
important for understanding demographic change, the interplay of these 
variables is forming trends insufficiently captured by classic models. In some 
wealthy nations, continual investment in the health and welfare of popula-
tions through adulthood helps create “morbidity compression” as people live 
longer and healthier lives. Survival curves better resemble survival rectangles 
(Kinsella and Phillips 2005). At the same time, epidemiologic transition is 
not inevitable or necessarily enduring. As the variable impact of HIV/AIDS 
demonstrates, how many people get sick and how sick they get depends in 
part on policy and resources. The hardest hit areas of this global pandemic 
are also in the poorest regions of the world.
Overall, demographic trends demonstrate how population aging has become 
a part of development rather than apart from it as an outcome or result. As 
one ages, the environment, health, and lifestyle choices made over the years 
impact health and everyday functioning into old age. Going forward, policy 
makers need to tease apart the interplay of development and demographic 
variables within each country context to better understand the interplay 
of demography, development in the global South, and “post-industrial” 
development of the global North. The key is not development as a linear 
process but rather development as a context affecting health and behaviors 
of age cohorts over time. Yet, aging policy frameworks tend to focus much 
more narrowly. In aging policy discourse, aging becomes a problem through 
the process of development. Development acts like a fulcrum that tips old 
age from a positive to negative social attribute. Attention is limited to older 
adults as frail, dependent, and vulnerable. The limitations of current aging 
policy are addressed in the next section.
III. PoPuLATIoN AgINg AS SocIAL PRobLeM: PoLIcy TReNDS 
As mentioned previously, global discussion of aging policy centers on pen-
sions and elder care. These kinds of policies were first created as part of state 
welfare systems in Western Europe. The earliest was in Germany, where 
social insurance for those 65-plus was started in 1889. Similar policies were 
developed in the Americas and in India in the 1920s and 1930s. Aging 
policy began spreading around the world in 1950 through a conference on 
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the global use of aging policy. Today, pension policies are found in most 
countries but coverage is often limited to particular groups, such as civil 
servants, the military, and workers in the formal sector. Only 30 percent of 
people 60-plus are covered through pension policies worldwide (Vincent 
2003). 
The historical, economic, and demographic context of half a century ago 
determined the way in which aging has been defined as a policy problem. 
This, in turn, has shaped subsequent policy solutions. Thus, while the cur-
rent policy crisis has been identified through demographic statistics, longer-  
term solutions may lie in reforming the meaning of aging in economic and 
social policy. This section begins with popular discussion of aging as a 
“Florida problem” normally confined to wealthy nations. Academic theory 
linking aging with development is next explored before moving to current 
policy trends for addressing population aging. Suggestions for new policy 
directions are made using ethnographic research on how older adults address 
the challenges of old age. 
Population Aging as a Florida Problem
Consider the following quote from a journalist:
  Want to see what the future has in store for Canada? Forget about 
crystal balls, soothsayers and opining pundits. The future of the country 
is unfolding in real time in our favorite winter getaway destination, the 
state of Florida (Griffiths 2007).
Despite the interdependence of factors underlying population aging and 
development trends, the above quotation captures much of the policy dis-
cussion on population aging. The image of Florida illustrates the dominant 
associations with aging found in policy and popular perception: Old age 
means retirement; means growing into a more frail and dependent physi-
cal and cognitive state; means pressure on health and other care systems to 
accommodate the demand; means assisted living communities. In short, 
Florida brings up two of the main issues that dominate policy discus-
sions on aging, particularly in the global North: retirement and long-term 
dependency. 
Countries’ individual demographic trends can be examined to determine 
when they will reach the Florida stage. The assumption is that policy will 
have to be developed globally as demographic change brings regions within 
the Florida range. The dominant theoretical framework underlying aging 
policy (as found in Europe, the U.S., and elsewhere) comes from another 
classic model of transitions. As discussed next, development is again the 
driver of change in this model. The result, however, is negative.  
Modernization (Industrialization) Theory as a Theory of Aging and  Development. 
In the early 1970s, Cowgill and Holmes demonstrated through compara-
tive national research that the “status” of older adults generally decreases 
as countries develop and industrialize (Cohen 1998; Cowgill and Holmes 
1972). Since then, additional scholars have critiqued, modified, and added 
to discussion of how and why this happens. As in demographic transition 
theory, the key factors are not found in the changing mode of production 
per se as much as in social structural changes that accompany a shift from 
economies based on agriculture to those of an industrialized wage economy. 
These factors include education, migration, and secularization. That is, 
in “traditional” or “premodern” societies, older adults command respect 
through control of resources, knowledge, and ascriptive roles. They own 
the land, which is the source of wealth, and they are most closely associated 
with powerful ancestors. Younger generations turn to them for advice as 
they grow into responsible members of the group. At the same time, older 
generations can rely on children and grandchildren to help them with every-
day tasks, particularly if their physical or cognitive functioning declines. As 
described by Nana Apt:
  Traditionally, the “family” especially was the greatest force that gave secu-
rity to its poor, its children, and its older members. Older persons formed 
an integral part of the civil society fabric and played an important role in 
harmonizing relations made tense through poverty, war, and conflict. The 
most striking feature of traditional care systems in Asia, Latin America, 
and Africa is that they are rooted in complex family systems that include 
reciprocal care and assistance among generations, with older people not 
only on the receiving end but also fulfilling an active, giving one (Apt 
2002).
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Development, however, brings in complicating factors. The first is the 
pressure of population growth, which helps push younger generations out 
of rural areas in search of better opportunities. Moving to cities and other 
countries, they turn to formal education for training and entry into the 
wage economy. Through separation from family and elders back home, their 
kinship ties loosen and they are exposed to both secular lifestyles and other 
religions (such as Christianity). This creates a generation gap in which the 
younger generations eventually surpass their parents in material and social 
success. These differences are greater in the first generation of development, 
and then diminish as the younger generation becomes the older cohort. 
Over time, continued population growth into the wage labor economy 
creates competition that is partially resolved through retirement policies. At 
this point, older adults find themselves devalued as they leave the roles con-
sidered productive and important in modern economies. In addition, they 
can no longer rely on younger generations to provide care because of geo-
graphical separation and a new emphasis on nuclear rather than extended 
family systems. The overall result is an inversion of socioeconomic status 
from old to young, as values and resources shift to younger generations. 
In application of modernization theory to current development contexts, 
some scholars emphasize subjective change (Aboderin 2004b). They link 
aging and development as a shift in cultural values and social norms. Oth-
ers, however, argue that elder respect persists but the problem lies in the 
unequal benefits of development as a global process (Aboderin 2004b). 
The stress of development breaks family solidarity and makes it difficult 
for families to care for older members. While culture persists, the objective 
means of expressing cultural ideals is eroding.  
Either approach supports a bifurcated theory of aging in society: success-
ful social, economic, and political change paradoxically ruins the social 
structure and social ties on which aging adults rely for what gerontologists 
call “successful aging.” Old age has become a casualty of development. 
This argument helps naturalize calls for state support and formal interven-
tion. Thus, aging policy becomes self-perpetuating: first helping to produce 
problems of retirement, dependence, and exclusion, and then offering policy 
solutions to enable old people to be secure, independent, and integrated 
within society. This process fuels a continual need for support as more 
people reach the age defined and addressed in policy as frail, dependent, and 
vulnerable.
Population Aging as Longer-Range Policy challenge
Given that old age is essentially defined in aging policy as an antithesis to 
development (i.e., as unproductive and dependent), it is not surprising 
when policy makers regard longer-range demographic trends with alarm. 
This is often expressed through dependency ratios, in which current and 
future dependency of older adults on the working population is calculated 
as the number of people 15–64 relative to those 65-plus.11 These ratios are a 
proxy for measuring the number of people paying into contributory pen-
sion programs relative to pensioners. The cause of crisis is partially found in 
previous underestimations of current population aging trends. For example, 
the United States’ Social Security program began in 1935. Beneficiaries 
had to be at least 65 and the program covered only a small percentage of 
that group. Social Security was 
expanded to cover older adults by 
the early 1970s (Hudson 2009). 
At that time, there were about 16 
people 65-plus per 100 work-
ing people aged 15–64 (United 
Nations 2009). As baby boomers 
reached peak working ages, the 
assumption was that dependency 
ratios would change but remain sustainable (Manton 1991). However, this 
was based on the assumption that life expectancy would remain close to 65 
rather than rise to 78 and without knowing how much fertility rates might 
decline (Manton 1991). Today, the dependency ratio is 19 (people 65-plus 
per 100 people ages 15–64) and projected to increase to 35 as baby boom-
11. Dependency ratios can be calculated as elder care ratios, as expressed above or as the dependency of 
older adults and children relative to working adults; thus, the numbers of people over 65 and under 15 
relative to those 15–64. Another statistic is a “parent support ratio” of people 85-plus relative to those 
in the younger generation that are likely to be the caregivers (age 50–64). According to a 2002 report 
from the Madrid conference on aging, “globally, there were fewer than 2 ‘oldest-old’ ” people for every 
100 people aged 50–64 in 1950. By 2000, this ratio was 4 to 1. By 2050, it is projected to increase to 11 
people 85-plus per 100 people 50–64 (United Nations 2002). 
Given that old age is essentially 
defined in aging policy as an antithesis 
to development (i.e., as unproductive 
and dependent), it is not surprising 
when policy makers regard longer-
range demographic trends with alarm.
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ers retire (United Nations 2009). This projection problem is not limited 
to Europe, North America, and Japan. In Latin America, most pension 
programs began in the 1920s and 1930s, when life expectancy was about 
35 (Segura-Ubiergo 2007). Retirement ages were set at 45 or 50. Over 
time, those pension programs expanded coverage and life expectancy also 
increased. Today, life expectancy has risen by decades. For example, life 
expectancy is 72 in Nicaragua and 78 in Costa Rica (United Nations 2009). 
On a global scale, dependency ratios are rising. The global dependency 
ratio rose from 8 to 11 (people 65-plus per 100 working-age people 15–64) 
between 1950 and 2005 (United Nations 2009). By 2050, this ratio will 
further rise to 25 (United Nations 2007). 
Dangerous Dependency Ratios or a Problem of Defining Old Age? Looking at cur-
rent numbers, some argue that population aging constitutes a natural disas-
ter for otherwise prosperous nations (Peterson 1999). This alarm is likely to 
spike in the current economic recession. Many suggestions for how to avert 
this crisis can be interpreted as an effort to recalibrate dependency ratios. 
One approach is to change population demographics. For example, Western 
European countries and Japan are reconsidering and revising immigration 
policy. Japan has been accused of trying to “export” older adults by encour-
aging long-term care in Europe and other parts of Asia (Martin 1991). A 
longer-term strategy is found in the pro-natalist policies of some Asian and 
Western European countries, so that an initial increase in overall depen-
dency ratios will eventually pay off in a “demographic dividend” of workers 
(Robertson 2007). Singapore, for example, offers state-sponsored dating 
services as well as child support (Martin 1991). Another approach is to 
redefine the boundary between old and young in aging policy. Given health 
gains that often accompany longevity gains, the most logical approach is to 
increase the number that defines who is old (Hudson 2009). Seventy years 
of age thus becomes the new 60. In the U.S., for example, the age for Social 
Security eligibility is rising. Another policy adaptation is to modify the 
definition of old as retired and unproductive by supporting older workers 
through retraining, enabling environments, or part-time work. For example, 
Japan is developing technology, such as robots, that can enable older work-
ers to be productive (Tirrito 2003).12 
On the other hand, why is chronological age the best proxy for old age? In 
policy, common definitions of old age are 50, 60, and 65. While analysts 
often add in the caveat that age is not just a number and that chronological 
age is merely a convenient proxy 
for aging and old age, reliance 
on these numbers persists. One 
way to explore additional ways to 
define aging is through ethno-
graphic research. As seen in the 
discussion about aging in the 
global South, there may be varia-
tions in social norms and cultural 
values that have been underuti-
lized by policy makers. In addition, scholars can now study the longer-term 
impact that aging policy has had in shaping the social structure and cultural 
meanings of old age.  
Lessons from ethnographic Research:  
“old age is just a number and mine is unlisted”
Ethnographic study of aging reveals that there is a common idea of old 
age. Across most cultures, there is a term for when someone becomes so 
frail and debilitated through aging that they become totally dependent 
upon others.13 The empirical question is not whether but when, how, and 
why this happens. Often, people delay getting old and prepare for old age 
through reciprocal exchange and the “social capital” of informal networks. 
In more youth-oriented societies, not only is old age avoided but also the 
entire aging process. “Anti-aging” efforts to improve health, productivity, 
and well-being then help realize an increasingly popular effort to enjoy 
12. Japan has also developed robots to replace workers and to provide elder care (Robertson 2007; Song-
min, Hada, and Takase 2004). In a sense, dependency ratios could then be recalibrated as robots are used 
to replace a projected 3.5 million workers by 2025 (Noor 2008).  
13. For example, Kertzer and Keith write that most cultures include a term for “decrepit” older adults 
(Kertzer and Keith 1984). 
In policy, common definitions of old 
age are 50, 60, and 65. While analysts 
often add in the caveat that age is not 
just a number and that chronological 
age is merely a convenient proxy for 
aging and old age, reliance on these 
numbers persists.
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the lifestyle of younger cohorts. In more “gerontocratic” (or what some 
call traditional) societies, growing older is first associated with becoming a 
mature adult (Kertzer and Keith 1984). Aging, then, is a positive process 
only achieved through such lifecycle milestones as getting married, having 
children, heading households, officiating important life ceremonies, and 
mourning the death of one’s parents (for discussion in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
see Oppong 2004). Thus, youth societies may be led by people in their 40s, 
and younger generations turn to elders for advice. In one’s career, evidence 
of lifelong maturity is a frequent criterion for choosing leaders. Later in life, 
those who do become old and frail can then turn to those they previously 
helped. As explained in an African proverb, “Just as elders help children cut 
their first teeth, so should adult children help elders who lose theirs.” 
Despite variations in how people grow old across cultures, reliance on family 
and informal networks for old age care is nearly universal.14 In other words, 
the cultural ideal in which family should provide care for old age endures 
as an international social norm. In many countries, wives and daughters 
assume most responsibility for aging relatives. Institutionalization is avoided 
as unacceptable or a last resort. Only in the very late stages of life might 
people in wealthier nations enter a nursing home or hospital. The average 
nursing home stay in the United States, for example, is less than three years 
(CDC 2009). 
How can policy definitions of aging and old age better reflect social experi-
ence? Ethnographic research provides data on how everyday realities may 
contradict policy-based assumptions. These data can also provide ideas for 
how to reform policy to better reflect current and future social and eco-
nomic trends affected by population aging. The following discussion is 
based on field research and interviews conducted in the U.S. and Ghana 
(Crampton 2007). This work provides insight into who is old in one 
wealthy, aging nation and one developing and poor nation. 
No Aging in the USA? One of the challenges in conducting research on old age 
in the U.S. is a disconnect between the construction of old age in policy, 
14. For example, Tirrito writes that family support is a common tradition (Tirrito 2003). Aboderin 
writes both of traditional norms and enduring reliance on family support in developing and developed 
regions (Aboderin 2006).
professional, and advocacy work on the one hand and everyday social mean-
ings and practices on the other. This disconnect is seen, for example, when 
an adult signs up for Social Security and then delivers meals on wheels to 
seniors out of sympathy for the elderly, or when a 70-year-old professional 
delivers a speech on the needs of older persons as the apex of a distinguished 
career rather than a spokesperson for this frail, vulnerable, and dependent 
population. 
The question “Who is old?” can be thus both easy and provocative to 
answer. Although sometimes taken aback, Americans often start with the 
easy answer of a bureaucratic choice. One option is the age of 60 used in the 
Older Americans Act. Another is the age of 65 historically used for Social 
Security. When resisting an easy answer, however, chronological age is often 
eschewed in favor of changes in identity and/or functioning.  For example, a 
70-plus person said:
  My mother is 90 and I did not think of her as old until she had a stroke 
and changed quite a bit. She had been the kind of person who is care-
ful to put on makeup and select what she wore before going out and she 
was no longer interested in that. Then, my sister and I noticed she had 
become forgetful (Crampton 2007).
Another person added that people can become old in their 40s while there 
are others she does not consider old who are in their 90s. The difference is 
one of attitude and activity. Thus, “old” was defined by loss of traits identi-
fied with mature adults and as a bodily and social experience that is actively 
avoided. This places policy makers and professionals in the awkward posi-
tion of serving involuntary clients—that is, people who would rather not 
identify as “an official geezer.” One clinical social worker explained that the 
hardest part of her job was convincing an older adult to accept being a cli-
ent. At a senior center, staff often seek older volunteers in the hope they will 
be more willing to later use the services themselves. 
Of course, old age cannot always be avoided. In this research and other 
studies, however, most old people still eschew old age services. Instead, they 
turn to informal services and networks. For example, one woman in her 90s 
relied upon neighbors, church members, and her therapist. She was afraid to 
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live alone and yet even more afraid that social services professionals would 
move her to a nursing home. So, she cheerfully refused agency help as she 
became increasingly frail and housebound. Her preference was to place 
newspaper ads for people to stay 
with her as needed. Her informal 
network helped monitor the situ-
ation, and she eventually found 
someone who would also provide 
basic nursing care. Eventually, 
she did need formal intervention 
and moved to a nursing home. 
However, she was able to avoid this move for several years in comparison to 
if she had tried to live entirely independently.15 In her new environment, she 
continues to both give and receive care. Although bedridden, she calls out 
greetings to caregivers and reads to her roommates. She is not simply alone.
The Importance of Social Ties and Reciprocity in Ghana. As in much of the 
global South (and perhaps the global North), old age in Ghana is based on 
whether one can work and support himself or herself (see also Apt 1996). In 
a labor-intensive economy, this often means being physically fit enough to 
work. The onset of old age comes when one is no longer able to contribute 
to one’s own care or that of others. For many Ghanaians, this becomes more 
likely as people reach age 80 and over. Until then, many develop strategies 
to earn income and contribute despite aging bodies. 
Although this may seem to contradict the idea that families offer an infor-
mal social safety net, it raises an important issue. The African proverb 
described earlier about elders helping children cut their teeth is a social con-
tract. That is, one does not care for elders solely as tradition; one cares for 
elders because of what they have done for you (see also Aboderin 2004a). 
Those who do not or cannot provide for their children as they grow may 
find that there is not as much care as they grow older. This is not to say that 
there is a calculated exchange but rather that respect and love as an elder has 
15. Most older adults live at home and receive care from family, but most people at the end of life receive 
paid care in nursing homes, hospitals, or hospices.  
to be deserved on some level. Many in the research study also complained 
that this love was more abundant in times when resources were also more 
abundant (Crampton 2007). In villages, children used to be routinely 
sent to share food with elders during harvests. This practice is less likely as 
resources deplete. A related comment was that old age seems to come earlier 
to people today because of stressful life circumstances. At the same time, 
people noted that social norms have changed: older adults cannot expect 
children to offer help as readily nor for younger people to seek their advice.
Overall, old age is not a particular age or even state of being as much as it 
is a status negotiated within interdependent relationships. People who have 
“done well” and shared generously with others are more likely to enjoy their 
later years as ones of rest and a sense of achievement. One example is an 
older woman who has become the head of her extended family. This means 
her opinion is consulted for important matters, her presence is especially 
requested for special events, and 
her advice is sought in counsel-
ing. She has earned her elder 
status not only within her family 
but also in the village through the 
care she has given to others and 
for organizing and leading vari-
ous associations. For example, she 
has created a “practical approach” 
to the problem of old age in 
her village. She began offering help to old people after a trip to Zimbabwe 
taught her that Africans might otherwise turn to creating nursing homes.16 
That is, she visits old people at home, tries to reduce family conflict that 
compromises elder care, lectures on reciprocity and care, and offers health 
promotion presentations. In doing this work, she has modeled the care she 
may need if she becomes old. 
16. As she explained, when the government made white farmers leave, many of the new owners were not 
interested in running the farms. The able bodied staff left, leaving older people behind. The new owners 
then formed support through what are effectively nursing homes. A recent study noted that there are 13 
nursing homes in Zimbabwe.
Of course, old age cannot always be 
avoided. In this research and other 
studies, however, most old people still 
eschew old age services. Instead, they 
turn to informal services and networks.
Overall, old age is not a particular age 
or even state of being as much as it is 
a status negotiated within interdepen-
dent relationships. People who have 
“done well” and shared generously 
with others are more likely to enjoy 
their later years as ones of rest and a 
sense of achievement.
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Policy Implications from ethnographic Research
Global trends project that most people alive today will live into the chrono-
logical ages defined as old. The longer-range future will also bring an 
increasing number of old people who are dependent on the love and kind-
ness of others for care. When formal intervention is available, it can provide 
help that is much needed. However, focusing on aging as a problem of 
old age is like writing the end of the story without first examining the plot 
progressions. As seen in both country examples, how people age and how 
(and if ) they grow old depends on choices, behaviors, and opportunities 
for health, productivity, and support across their lifespan. In both more 
traditional and modern societies, older adults resist meeting the underlying 
definition of old in social policy. In the U.S., this is partly due to avoiding 
the stigma of old age. In Ghana, this is part of a more general life strategy 
and striving for social success and eventual elder status. These strategies can 
be generalized into examination of how people actively negotiate autonomy 
across the lifecourse and cultural contexts. The timing and implications of 
old age are then embedded within a larger question of political, economic, 
and social relations.  
Despite the importance of family and social contexts, current aging policy 
tends to narrowly focus on state obligations to aging individuals. Through 
social and health insurance, the state rescues old people from poverty and poor 
health. One way out of the policy crisis of aging may be to re-conceptualize 
aging in social and economic policy. If this definition were based more on 
ethnographic realities rather than statistical calculations, then aging would 
become part of human development. That is, aging policy would consist 
first of understanding how people can “successfully” grow from child to 
older adult. Those adults who receive opportunities to do well as they grow 
up need less formal support to replace independent resources, family ties, 
and informal networks. Once care is needed, the issue is not only a social 
contract between the state and individuals but also between the state and 
families. Family planning would thus require more than plans for reducing 
fertility. Supportive family policy would focus on developing and sustain-
ing a healthy, productive workforce. This might require labor policy that 
requires the state or employers to subsidize the care that family and infor-
mal caregivers provide through direct funds such as paid leave. At the same 
time, aging policy would define old age as a composite variable rather than 
chronological age. For example, old age might be defined as a number in 
combination with capacity to fulfill what gerontologists call the “activities 
of daily living.” These are the activities required to look after oneself and 
to live productively. A more complex variable might reduce the numbers of 
active adults who are defined by policy as old and increase attention to those 
who do become frail, vulnerable, and dependent. 
coNcLuSIoN: geTTINg ReADy FoR gRANNy
In looking beyond a current sense of crisis to the longer-range implications 
of global aging, there are three main points to review. The first is that demo-
graphic trends are outpacing current theoretical frameworks. These frame-
works include demographic, epidemiologic, and modernization theory, 
which best describe the historic rise of population aging and policy trends 
in Western Europe. As population aging occurs around the world, however, 
new trends seem to outpace or outgrow this classic model. Most of the 
global North, in fact, is in a post-transition phase. This includes population 
shrinkage as fertility rates fall below replacement level. This also includes a 
longevity trend in which living well beyond 60 or 65 is increasingly com-
mon. Meanwhile, the demographic transition that first took three to five 
generations in Western Europe is now taking place in one or even less. In 
most of the global South, population aging trends are driven by a combina-
tion of falling birth rates and increasing survival rates of the young. Thus, 
part of the long-term future of aging is found in the “youth bulge” in parts 
of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. While policy makers may be focused 
on Florida today, future cohorts of older adults will increasingly come from 
countries like Brazil, Nigeria, and even Bangladesh. 
The main limitation of current theoretical frameworks in policy making 
is that they replace changes over time with stagnant, linear stages. This 
allows the odd heuristic of analyzing countries at one point in time as 
being early, on time, or late. If countries were analyzed based on changes 
over time rather than changes in relation to a universal standard, then the 
complex interplay of development and demographic factors might be easier 
to discern. This might help explain, for example, how a country can get 
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old before it gets rich. At the same time, we know how trends can change 
through war, pandemics, and the failure to provide support for human 
development. We also know from the dramatic example of China how 
policy can impact long-range demographic trends. Country-based studies 
can be a start for rethinking how to define who is old and the role of aging 
in labor, health, and care policies within these complex contexts. 17  
The second point is the narrow concept of aging found in current policy. 
Aging policy tends to place older adults outside of economic and human 
development. These policies were first created in countries when it seemed 
that expanding economies and welfare systems could keep pace with life 
expectancy and dependency ratio trends. The aging question in policy then 
focused on how to manage and care for old people who are unproductive and 
dependent. As fear of population explosion gives way to fear of population 
aging, one solution is to reduce the calculated numbers of older adults by 
increasing the chronological marker of old age in policy. However, another 
(or additional) may be to expand the policy lens on aging. This would first 
involve recognition that aging is part of the entire lifespan and not simply 
a loss suffered around age 60. Public health, family planning, child welfare, 
and health care are implicitly part of aging policy because they all impact 
how people age and when they become old. 
Not only should aging policy expand ideas about who is old but also about 
who cares about the process of aging. This raises the third point, that aging 
policy should include family and informal networks. While aging policy has 
focused on the responsibility of the state to aging individuals, the reality is 
that the state often relies upon families and informal networks for most of 
old age care. Long-range aging policy, then, requires consideration of the 
social contract between the state and family. Current examples are found 
in pro-natalist policies. Labor laws and social welfare are used to support 
families to both care for children and provide productive labor in the formal 
17. Of course, there are limitations to using countries as the unit of analysis—globalization requires 
recognition of interdependent trends among nations. For example, many family members (including 
older adults) rely on remittances from overseas relatives. This support is probably not calculated in most 
dependency ratios. Similarly, the productivity of working adults varies with the value of their labor 
within an increasingly international economy. On the other hand, most aging and social welfare policies 
are implemented on the national rather than international level.
economy. Aging policy might further intertwine labor and social welfare 
with retirement and social security. Pension reform then becomes just one 
element within the question of old age care. This approach will be increas-
ingly important as families try 
to care for aging relatives and 
children while both women and 
men work outside the home. As 
family composition changes in 
many parts of the world, policy 
makers will increasingly need 
to consider the “beanpole” of 
multiple generations rather than 
the extended branches of family 
trees. As aging policy spans the globe, cultural variations in defining family 
will also require consideration.
In conclusion, there is no reason to fear “the coming age of grannies” if 
revised policy frameworks are applied to a lifespan approach to global aging. 
Policy makers should recognize how emphasis in the developing world on 
mothers and children has helped lay the foundation for today and tomor-
row’s aging policy concerns. As these children grow into older adults, cross-
cultural research demonstrates a common concept of old age as decline and 
loss. However, how people become old and even whether they become old is 
not a question of chronological age as much as a one of social relations and 
context. In particular, older adults avoid and prepare for getting old through 
interdependent relationships with family and informal networks. This hap-
pens in both countries like the U.S., in which the state provides old age 
support, and countries like Ghana that lack national aging policy. Efforts by 
the state to define who is old and then replace informal and familial support 
may be unsustainable. In using a lifespan approach, however, aging policy 
would be part of human development. Aging policy frameworks could be 
revised so that the state supports individual effort to delay old age as well 
as family- or community-based care for dependent relatives. The longer-
range challenge is less about a rising tide of older adults than about how 
social policy can positively influence human and social development across a 
lengthening lifecycle.  
While aging policy has focused on 
the responsibility of the state to aging 
individuals, the reality is that the state 
often relies upon families and informal 
networks for most of old age care. 
Long-range aging policy, then, requires 
consideration of the social contract 
between the state and family.
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